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Introduction
International human rights law imposes obligations on States to protect the
rights of the individuals within their jurisdiction. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) states that it is "a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations," and places an obligation on every individual and every
organ of society "to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by pro-
gressive measures, national and international, to secure their individual and ef-
fective recognition and observance."' It has become clear since the UDHR was ad-
opted that the responsibility of States for breaches of human rights law "ought to
be complemented by perpetrators' individual responsibility under criminal and
civil law."2 Human rights monitoring bodies are increasingly placing positive obli-
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 A (III) (1948), Preamble.
2 Ilias Bantekas, "Individual Responsibility and the Evolving Status of the Physical Person
in International Human Rights Law," in Mashood A. Baderin and Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds.,
International Human Rights Law: Six Decades after the Universal Declaration of Human
Japanese Yearbook of International Law
Vol. 58 (2015), pp. 45-70.
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gations on States to ensure compliance with human rights instruments by utilising
domestic criminal law to criminalize certain types of behaviour, to investigate
criminal behaviour and to prosecute and punish private individuals' conduct which
is not in line with the rights set out in human rights instruments. Bantekas states
that "[c]riminalization (and punishment) is not an aim within itself, but is a nec-
essary ingredient for the primary aim, which is the protection of human beings. ''3
This article analyses how human rights treaties and human rights monitoring
bodies have increasingly embraced a criminal law approach with regard to en-
suring the protection of human rights. After a brief discussion of the historic rela-
tionship of international human rights law and international criminal law, we focus
on how certain United Nations' (UN) human rights treaties include provisions
which require States to criminalize certain activities within their jurisdiction in
order to ensure the protection of the human rights of individuals therein. This
section also addresses how UN human rights monitoring bodies have interpreted
these provisions and how UN treaty bodies have encouraged States to adopt
criminal sanctions. Finally, we then turn to developments within the Council of
Europe system, examining the provisions of the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR)4 which require States Parties to prohibit certain types of behaviour
in order to protect human rights as well as the expansive approach to a criminal-
ization requirement taken by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
I. Background to the Relationship of International Human Rights Law and
International Criminal Law
International law has "clearly moved towards much greater criminalization"
of the wrongs of individuals. Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials,6 the criminal-
ization of violations of certain human rights has taken centre stage in the field of
international law and the idea of criminal law as an enforcement avenue for
human rights law has been re-enforced with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals
Rights and Beyond (2010), p. 431. See also Ineke Boerefijn, "Establishing State Responsibility
for Breaching Human Rights Treaty Obligations: Avenues under UN Human Rights Treaties,"
Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2009), p. 168.
3 Bantekas, supra note 2, p. 438.
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 213, p. 222 (No. 2889).
Theodor Meron, "Is International Law Moving towards Criminalization?," European
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), p. 30.
6 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945;
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, Tokyo, 19 January 1946.
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for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda7 along with hybrid tribunals such as
the Special Court for Sierra Leone.8 The place of international criminal law as an
important component of human rights protection was confirmed with the creation
of the International Criminal Court,' and "international criminal law" has now
emerged as a discipline resulting from "the combination of human rights law, in-
ternational humanitarian law and national criminal law."'1 Indeed, this is not sur-
prising given that the "goods" protected under the umbrella of international
criminal law are protected likewise by those other older bodies of law," and
International Criminal Law has, at times, been guided by international human
rights standards, 2 and international criminal tribunals have regularly referred to
human rights treaties in their judgments. 3 Soares comments that "[w]ith the emer-
gence of international criminal law, the distinction between human rights and
criminal law became blurred."'4 "International criminal law has thus far offered an
avenue for holding individuals responsible for those gross human rights violations
7 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, adopted 1993 and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted 1994.
8 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002.
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
10 Patricia Pinto Soares, "Tangling Human Rights and International Criminal Law: The
Practice of International Tribunals and the Call for Rationalized Legal Pluralism," Criminal
Law Forum, Vol. 23, Nos. 1-3 (2012), p. 161.
it Ibid., p. 162.
12 The willingness of international criminal tribunals to accept human rights standards has
been criticized for a lack of methodology and stringency. Soares states that "international
criminal law has undergone controversial developments due to resorting to human rights
law in a somewhat erratic manner which overlooks the differences, and sometimes the
opposition, between the telos of both legal areas, often imperilling the principles of legality
and individual culpability as unique foundational rationales of international criminal law."
Ibid., p. 161.
13 See Gu~nael Mettraux, "Using Human Rights Law for the Purpose of Defining International
Criminal Offences - The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia," in Marc Henzelin and Robert Roth eds., Le Droit p6nal t4 'epreuve de
l'internationalisation (2002), p. 193.
14 Soares, supra note 10, p. 171. See also William A. Schabas, "Criminal Responsibility for
Violations of Human Rights," in Janusz Symonides ed., Human Rights: International
Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (2003), p. 281.
48 Michael O'Flaherty and Noelle Higgins
that qualify as international crimes."'5
The development of individual criminal responsibility from Nuremberg on-
wards has placed the focus on the individual in the international legal order. The
Nuremberg Principles were embraced by the UN'6 and the Geneva Conventions of
1949 included specific references to individual criminal responsibility in the grave
breaches provisions. 7 Subsequently, the UN adopted the Genocide Convention'8
and the Convention on Apartheid,19 which criminalize acts of genocide and
apartheid and require States Parties to punish perpetrators. However, when the UN
turned its attention to human rights in general, rather than to breaches of those
human rights laws which constitute international crimes, it chose an approach dif-
ferent from that of criminalization. The UDHR and the nine associated UN human
rights treaties 0 have very few references to criminal law obligations and sanctions.
15 Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, "State Responsibility for Human Rights," in Baderin and
Ssenyonjo eds., supra note 2, p. 409.
16 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nurnberg Tribunal, General Assembly Resolution 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
17 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (No. 1), United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 31 (No. 970), Art. 50;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (No. II), United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 85
(No. 971), Art. 51; Convention Relative to the Prisoners of War (No. Ill), United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 135 (No. 972), Art. 130; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (No. IV), United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 75, p. 287 (No.
973), Art. 147.
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 78, p. 277 (No. 1021). The Genocide Convention states that genocide is
"a crime under international law" and that States Parties "undertake to prevent and to
punish" through both domestic courts and international tribunals that have jurisdiction.
19 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1015, p. 243 (No. 14861). Under Article 3 of the
Convention, international criminal responsibility is to apply to individuals, members of
organizations and representatives of the State who commit, incite or conspire to commit
the crime of apartheid. Article 4 requires States Parties to adopt legislation to suppress and
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or
their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime.
20 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A
(XXI) of 16 December 1966; International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural
Rights, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by
General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979; Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General
Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26June 1987; Convention
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Rather than emphasize individual criminal responsibility, international human
rights law focused almost solely on State responsibility. The same approach was
taken by regional human rights organizations and treaties, which also, for the most
part, place a responsibility on States to protect the rights of the individuals within
their jurisdictions, rather than on the individual through criminal responsibility. A
handful of provisions in international and regional human rights treaties do,
however, oblige States to implement a criminal law framework and/or impose
criminal sanctions in respect of certain types of behaviour. In addition, human
rights monitoring bodies have in some instances taken such ideas further than
might be suggested by the texts of the relevant treaties, especially within the
Council of Europe system.
While it is clear that human rights treaties do not provide for individual
criminal responsibility, rather requiring States to criminalize certain behaviors
under domestic criminal law, the treaties have contributed significantly to the work
of domestic and international judicial bodies in this regard. The requirement to
criminalize certain types of behaviour incumbent on States Parties of human rights
treaties paved the way first for the ad hoc tribunals, and now the international
criminal court, to identify numerous general principles of law,2" for example the
principle that a trial must be established by law, 2 and the principle of proportion-
ality between a penalty and the gravity of the crime.23 In addition, "[i]t would be
hard to imagine the unprecedented emergence of individual criminal responsibility
in the post-Cold-War era without the increased international legal personality
granted to individuals through the human rights treaties.
' 24
on the Rights of the Child, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November
1989; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18
December 1990; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, adopted 20 December 2006; Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, adopted 13 December 2006.
21 See Bantekas, supra note 2, p. 439.
22 Prosecutor v. Tadi4 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 42.
23 Prosecutor v. Blaski4 Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, IT-95-14-T, para. 796. See
Mohamed ELewa and Noelle Higgins, "General Principles of Law in the Early Jurisprudence
of the ICC," in Triestino Mariniello ed., The International Criminal Cottrt Search of Its
Purpose and Identity (2015), pp. 263-282.
24 See Bantekas, supra note 2, p. 439.
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II. Analysis of the Implementation of International Human Rights Law via Domestic
Criminal Law
This section provides an analysis of how UN human rights treaties and General
Comments of the treaty bodies call for the criminalization of certain acts in the do-
mestic law of States Parties. The discussion focuses on a number of principal pro-
visions which require State prohibition of certain behavior, i.e. Article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in addition to Article
9 regarding detention and the related General Comment No. 35 of the Human
Rights Committee (HRC), as well as Article 4 of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). We begin with a
general discussion of the positive obligations doctrine.
1. The Positive Obligations Doctrine
Typically, human rights instruments require States to not only refrain from in-
terfering in individuals' rights but also to take action to ensure that individuals'
rights are not breached by non-State actors. The doctrine of positive obligations
"acknowledges that constraints on individuals' freedom, autonomy and capabilities
may not be the result of the exercise of state power alone but do in fact also
follow from social forces and the conduct of private individuals, groups and
organisations."25 The idea that States had positive obligations to ensure the en-
joyment of rights enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties for
people within their jurisdiction was considered by Henry Shue, who argued in
1980 that every basic right has three corollary duties: to avoid depriving, to protect
from deprivation and to aid the deprived. 2 This thinking was further developed
and refined by Asbjorn Eide, the Special Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as the duties to respect,
to protect and fulfil.2 7 This tripartite categorisation has now been accepted widely
by human rights bodies and domestic law regimes and the positive obligations
principle is echoed in regional human rights treaties.28 This doctrine, in some in-
25 Piet Hein van Kempen, "Four Concepts of Security - A Human Rights Perspective,"
Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013), p. 17.
26 Henry Shue, Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (1980), p. 52.
27 See Asbjorn Eide, "Final Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right," U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987) and Martin Scheinin, "Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights as Legal Rights," in Asbjorn Eide et at. eds., Economic, Social, Cultural Rights. A
Textbook (1995), pp. 41-62.
2 ECHR, supra note 4, Art. 1(1); American Convention on Human Rights, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 1144, p. 143 (No. 17955), Art. 1(1). See also Commission Nationale des
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stances, requires States to prohibit and indeed to criminalize certain behaviours
within their jurisdiction in order to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires States Parties
"to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant."2 9 The use of this phrasing indi-
cates that States must take positive measures to ensure the protection of the re-
spective rights in addition to refraining from interfering itself with those rights. In
General Comment 31 the HRC states that the obligations envisaged in Article 2(1)
are "both negative and positive in nature. '" 30 At paragraph 8 of the General
Comment, the Committee indicates that while the ICCPR does not have horizontal
effect nevertheless States Parties are required to protect individuals from "acts
committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of
Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private
persons or entities." 3' Article 2 of the ICCPR divides the duty to protect into two,
i.e. firstly States are under a duty to take measures to prevent human rights viola-
tions by non-State actors and secondly, they are required to take corrective mea-
sures once a violation has occurred.
In order to address the first part of this duty States may be under an obligation
to utilize domestic law to prohibit and deter human rights violations. The HRC has
stated that States are required to put in place a legislative framework which pro-
hibits acts constituting arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy, family,
home or correspondence by natural and legal persons.32 In addition, with regard to
the right to life, the Committee has stated that the State should "establish effective
facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly cases of missing and disap-
peared persons."3 General Comment 31 observes that there may be circumstances
Droits de l'Homme et des Libert~s v. Chad, Communication No. 74/92 (1995), (2000) AI-IRLR
66 (ACHPR 1995).
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.
999, p. 171 (No. 14668), Art. 2.
30 General Comment No. 31, The Nature of Legal Obligations Imposed on State Parties to the
Covenant, 29 March 2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (2004), para. 6.
31 Ibid., para. 8.
32 See General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 8
April 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988), paras. 1, 2 and 9-10; General Comment No. 10:
Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion), 29 June 1983, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983), paras. 2-3.
33 General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 30 April 1982, U.N. Doc. 30/04/82
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where a State may breach the ICCPR if it fails "to take appropriate measures or to
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused
by such acts by private persons or entities."'
Article 20 of the ICCPR explicitly requires States to prohibit certain types of
behaviour. This provision states:
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by
law.
The non-governmental organization, whose name is Article 19, observes that
"[t]his provision employs a double-barrelled formulation, whereby what is to be
prohibited is advocacy of hatred that 'constitutes' incitement rather than simply
incitement."3 Article 19 points out, however, that States have been reluctant to in-
corporate the language of Article 20 in domestic legislation regarding "incitement."
The organization states that "[t]he absence of reference to 'incitement' in domestic
legislation suggests that States are either unwilling to take on the language of the
ICCPR's Article 20 or are simply ignorant of it. The lack of reference to Article 20 of
the ICCPR by state authorities (including by the judiciary) of States parties to the
ICCPR, or their ignorance of these provisions, does provide potentially a significant
hurdle to the effective implementation of a consistent threshold in relation to 'in-
citement' in the first instance."
There has been concern expressed with regard to the impact of the prohi-
bition obligation found in Article 20 ICCPR on the enjoyment of the right to
freedom of expression which is enshrined in Article 19. 37 One of the present au-
thors (O'Flaherty) has observed elsewhere that Article 20 is a "curiosity, imposing
an obligation but not creating a right" and also observed that it engendered much
discussion during the treaty negotiation. The original proposal included an obli-
(1982), para. 4.
'A General Comment No. 31, supra note 30, para. 8.
31 Article 19, Towards an Interpretation of Article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for the
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Work in Progress, A study prepared for the regional
expert meeting on Article 20, Organized by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Vienna, February 8-9, 2010, p. 2.
3 Ibid.
17 Ibid. See also Michael O'Flaherty, "Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment
No 34," Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2012), pp. 627-654.
8 O'Flaherty, ibid., p. 635.
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gation to criminalize certain types of expression rather than merely prohibit them
but this came to be discarded. 9 Proponents for inclusion of the criminalization lan-
guage had insisted that the type of extreme expression addressed in Article 20 was
so dangerous that prohibition was required, while opponents were concerned that
its inclusion would encourage censorship. 0
3. General Comment 35
In 2014, the HRC adopted General Comment 354" with regard to Article 9 of
the ICCPR on the topic of the liberty and security of the person.42 Article 9 states:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such pro-
cedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the
reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges
against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or
to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall
have an enforceable right to compensation.
The General Comment goes beyond the textual limits of the ICCPR with regard
to the measures States Parties must undertake to fully implement Article 9.
39 Marc Bossuyt, Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1987), p. 403.
40 See O'Flaherty, supra note 37, p. 635.
41 General Comment No. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), 16 December 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014).
42 See, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/DGCArticle9.aspx>.
54 Michael O'Flaberty and Noelle Higgins
Paragraph 9 of the General Comment indicates that States Parties should take "both
measures to prevent future injury and retrospective measures such as enforcement
of criminal laws, in response to past injury,"43 thus including a criminalization el-
ement. The General Comment goes on to give examples of such measures and
states that States Parties "must respond appropriately to patterns of violence against
categories of victims such as intimidation of human rights defenders and jour-
nalists, retaliation against witnesses, violence against women, including domestic
violence, the hazing of conscripts in the armed forces, violence against children,
violence against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity,
and violence against persons with disabilities. They should also prevent and re-
dress unjustifiable use of force in law enforcement, and protect their populations
against abuses by private security forces, and against the risks posed by excessive
availability of firearms. ''44
Paragraph 9 of General Comment 35 clearly draws from long-standing practice
of the HRC in communications before them. In Chongwe v. Zambia,45 the author
stated that the police fired on the vehicle in which he was travelling, slightly
wounding former President Kaunda of Zambia and inflicting a life-threatening
wound on the author. The police force subsequently promised to undertake its
own investigation. The HRC observed that:46
The interpretation of article 9 does not allow a State party to ignore threats
to the personal security of non-detained persons subject to its jurisdiction.
In the present case, it appears that persons acting in an official capacity
within the Zambian police forces shot at the author, wounded him, and
barely missed killing him. The State party has refused to carry out inde-
pendent investigations, and the investigations initiated by the Zambian
police have still not been concluded and made public, more than three
years after the incident. No criminal proceedings have been initiated and
the author's claim for compensation appears to have been rejected. In the
circumstances, the Committee concludes that the author's right to security of
person, under article 9, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, has been violated.
43 General Comment No. 35, supra note 41, para. 9.
44 Ibid.
45 Chongwe v. Zambia, Communication No. 821/1998, 25 October 2000.
46 Ibid., para. 5.
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In Lalith Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka,47 and Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia48 the
HRC reiterated that while the ICCPR does not provide a right for individuals to re-
quire that States Parties criminally prosecute any person,49 States Parties are never-
theless under a duty to thoroughly investigate alleged human rights violations and
to prosecute those responsible for them.
4. The Human Rights Committee, State Reports and Concluding Observations
Within the context of the review by the HRC of State party reports, it fre-
quently identifies a requirement to uphold human rights by means of the estab-
lishment and implementation of criminal law regimes. Notably, such requirements
range beyond those very limited contexts wherein the ICCPR specifically requires
the State to prohibit an action. In order to illustrate this practice, the Concluding
Observations on State reports to the HRC Committee in 2014 are examined below.
In 2014, the HRC adopted Concluding Observations on the reports of 17 States
and made a number of comments in relation to States' criminalization obligations.
In Concluding Observations on the initial report of Haiti the HRC recalled the State
party's "obligation to bring criminal proceedings for any serious violation of human
rights."50 In Concluding Observations on a report by Sri Lanka, the HRC stated that
the State should "publish all official places of detention on a regular basis and ex-
plicitly forbid and criminalize the use of unofficial places for detention.-1 In
Concluding Observations on Japan, the HRC recommended that the State "take the
necessary legislative measures to criminalize sexual harassment and to prohibit
and sanction, with appropriate penalties, unfair treatment based on pregnancy and
childbirth. ' '2 In its comments to Ireland, the HRC welcomed the adoption of the
47 Sundara Arachchige Lalith Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, Communication No. 1250/2004, 4
September 2006, para. 9.7.
Bautista deArellana v. Colombia, Communication No. 563/1993, 11 October 1994, para.
8.6
49 The HRC referred to previous communications to support this, e.g., Arhuaco v. Colombia,
Communication No. 612/1995, 29 July 1997; H.C.M.A. v. the Netherlands, Case No.
213/1986, adopted 30 March 1989; S.E. v. Argentina, Case No. 275/1988, adopted 26 March
1990; R.A., VN. et al. v. Argentina, Case Nos. 343-345/1988, adopted 26 March 1990.
50 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Haiti, 21 November 2014, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/HTI/CO/1 (2014), para. 7.
51 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Sri Lanka, 21 November
2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/LKA/CO/5 (2014), para. 17.
52 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Japan, 20 August 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6 (2014), para. 9.
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Criminal Justice (Female Genital Mutilation) Act two years previously. 3 The issue
of female genital mutilation also arose in the case of Malawi's report when the
HRC recommended that the State explicitly criminalize the practice of female
genital mutilation in addition to "'sexual cleansing' rituals and 'widow inheritance. 54
It also recommended that the State criminalize spousal rape,55 expedite the
adoption of legislation criminalizing all forms of trafficking,16 amend the Penal
Code to criminalize all forms of sexual abuse of children regardless of their
gender, 7 and "expedite the adoption of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations
Bill and ensure that it explicitly criminalizes forced and child marriages and sets
the minimum age of marriage in accordance with international standards." 8
In Concluding Observations on Sudan, the HRC recommended that the State
ensure protection of the rights of women by amending its Criminal Code by crimi-
nalizing domestic violence and marital rape,59 and adopt legislation that crimi-
nalizes torture and defines it in accordance with international standards.6 In re-
sponse to Chile's report, the HRC recommended that "[t]he State party should
repeal article 373 of the Criminal Code and ensure that all acts of violence that are
committed because of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim are
investigated, prosecuted and punished. '6' In its Concluding Observations on
Kyrgyzstan's report, the HRC recommended that States initiate criminal proceedings
against perpetrators of torture. 62 Responding to the report of the United States, the
HRC recommended that the State incorporate the principle of "command responsi-
bility" in its domestic law.6" It also recommended that "[tihe State party should
enact legislation to explicitly prohibit torture, including mental torture, wherever
13 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Ireland, 19 August 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014).
54 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Initial Periodic Report of Malawi, 19 August 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MWI/CO/1/Add.1 (2014), para. 8.
15 Ibid., para. 14.
6 Ibid., para. 17.
51 Ibid., para. 24.
18Ibid., para. 25.
59 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report on the Sudan, 19 August
2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SDN/CO/4 (2014), para. 12.
Ibid., para. 15.
61 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Chile, 13 August 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHL/CO/6 (2014), para. 14.
62 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report on Kyrgyzstan, 23 April
2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KGZ/CO/2 (2014), para. 15.
63 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report on the United States of
America, 23 April 2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (2014), para. 5.
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committed, and ensure that the law provides for penalties commensurate with the
gravity of such acts, whether committed by public officials or other persons acting
on behalf of the State, or by private persons. The State party should ensure the
availability of compensation to victims of torture. ,,64
Responding to the initial report of Sierra Leone, the HRC recommended that
the State adopt into its legislation a definition of torture in line with international
standards and that it investigate allegations of torture and prosecute perpetrators. 6
With regard to Nepal, the HRC recommended that the State "[e]nsure that all gross
violations of international human rights law, including torture and enforced disap-
pearances, are explicitly prohibited as criminal offences under domestic law."6 It
also recommended that the State enact legislation prohibiting torture in line with
international standards.6 7 Finally, in response to Latvia's report, the HRC recom-
mended that the State Party establish domestic violence and rape68 as well as
torture 69 as specific crimes in its domestic law, and it also recommended that the
State "[i]mplement criminal law provisions aimed at combating racially motivated
crimes, punish perpetrators with appropriate penalties and facilitate the reporting
procedure for hate crimes. ' ' 0
5. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
Article 4 of CERD 71 requires States parties to, "declare an offence punishable
by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also
the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof."
This formulation is much broader than Article 20(2) of the ICCPR and goes beyond
reference to prohibition. It requires States to criminalize the dissemination of ideas
as well as incitement in the absence of intent. The provision requires States Parties
64 Ibid., para. 12.
65 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Sierra Leone, 17 April 2014, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SLE/CO/1 (2014), para. 16.
66 HRC, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Nepal, 15 April 2014,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NPL/CO/2 (2014), para. 5.
67 Ibid., para. 10.
HRC, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Latvia, 11 April 2014, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/LVA/CO/3 (2014), para. 9.
69 Ibid., para. 11.
70 Ibid., para. 19.
71 CERD, supra note 20.
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to prohibit and punish four categories of misconduct: (i) dissemination of ideas
based upon racial superiority or hatred; (ii) incitement to racial hatred; (iii) acts of
violence against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin;
and (iv) incitement to such acts.72 The criminalization requirement 3 is monitored
closely in the practice of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD Committee). The CERD Committee's General Recommendation 1 relates to
Article 4. It states that when undertaking its review of State reports the Committee
has found "that the legislation of a number of States parties did not include the
provisions envisaged in article 4(a) and (b) of the Convention" 4 and accordingly
recommended to States Parties whose legislation was deficient in this respect to
duly amend it. In a similar vein, in General Recommendation 7,75 the Committee
reiterated that many States Parties had not fulfilled all of the requirements of Article
4 and once again recommended that they take the necessary steps to amend their
legislation in line with the mandatory requirements of Article 4. The Committee
called on States to highlight in their periodic reports how Article 4 is effectively
implemented. In General Recommendation 15,76 while again highlighting the im-
portance of Article 4, it stated that the provision had grown further in importance
due to the increase in organised violence based on ethnic origin and the political
exploitation of ethnic difference. The CERD Committee stated that to satisfy Article
4 obligations "States parties have not only to enact appropriate legislation but also
to ensure that it is effectively enforced. Because threats and acts of racial violence
easily lead to other such acts and generate an atmosphere of hostility, only imme-
diate intervention can meet the obligations of effective response.
'
"
77
The CERD Committee has examined the implementation of Article 4 in its
review of various communications. In Gelle v. Denmark it addressed the question of
whether Danish authorities had fulfilled their "positive obligation to take effective
action against reported incidents of racial discrimination."78 It found that the mere
criminalization of racial discrimination was insufficient, and stated that it is implicit
72 Art. 4(b) of CERD.
73 See Wibbke Kristin Timmermann, "The Relationship between Hate Propaganda and
Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in International Law towards Criminalization of Hate
Propaganda," Leiden Journal of International Law, Vo. 18, No. 2 (2005), pp. 257-282.
74 General Recommendation 1, States' Parties Obligations (Art. 4), 25/02/72.
75 General Recommendation 7, Legislation to Eradicate Racial Discrimination (Art. 4),
23/08/85.
76 General Recommendation 15, Organized Violence Based on Ethnic Origin (Art. 4),
23/03/93.
Ibid., para. 6.
78 CERD, Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No. 34/2004, Opinion of 6 March 2006, U.N.
Doc. A/61/18 (2006), Annex IV, para. 7.2.
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in Article 4 that "criminal laws and other legal provisions prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation must also be effectively implemented by the competent national tribunals
and other State institutions. '" 79 It based this finding also on Denmark's obligations
under Article 2(1)(d) which imposes a duty to prohibit racial discrimination and
under Article 6 which imposes a duty to assure effective protection and remedies.
In Dawas and Shava v. Denmarkl the CERD Committee dealt with a situation
where the house of a refugee of Iraqi origin had been attacked by more than 35
people. The house was damaged and Mahali Dawas and another member of his
family were beaten. The attackers told the refugees to "go home." The Committee
stated that "the issue before the Committee is whether the state party fulfilled its
positive obligation to properly investigate and prosecute the assault suffered by
the petitioners [...] having regard to its duty, under article 2 of the Convention, to
take effective action against reported incidents of racial discrimination."'' The
Committee considered that the attack warranted a thorough investigation by police
into the possible racist nature of the attack but that the investigation which was in
fact carried out was incomplete. Therefore the State had failed to effectively protect
the petitioners from an alleged act of racial discrimination and had violated Article
6 and Article 2(1)(d) of CERD.
6. The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, State
Reports and Concluding Observations
The CERD Committee raises Article 4-related issues with regard to its review
of every periodic report. For instance, in 2014 it recommended to Cameroon that it
"speed up the process of harmonizing the Criminal Code to ensure that acts of
racial discrimination and incitement to racial hatred are defined and criminalized in
the light of the Convention." 2 In its Concluding Observations on Peni's report, the
CERD Committee referred to its General Recommendations 7 and 15 with regard to
Article 4 of CERD and urged the government "to include in its criminal legislation
the offence of racial discrimination and an offence that combines all the elements
of article 4 of the Convention while also conforming with general recommendation
No. 35 (2013) on combating racist hate speech."'83 Regarding the report of El
Salvador, the CERD Committee aired concerns about the completeness of its
79 Ibid.
CERD, Dawas and Shava v. Denmark, Communication No. 46/2009, 6 March 2012.
8' Ibid., para. 7.2.
82 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Periodic Reports of
Cameroon, 26 September 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CMR/CO/19-21 (2014), para. 7.
"3 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Eighteenth to Twenty-First Periodic Reports of
Peru, 25 September 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/PER/CO/18-21 (2014), para. 10.
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Criminal Code and encouraged the government to "bring its legal provisions re-
lating to the offence of racial discrimination into line with article 4 of the
Convention."'M Similarly, in response to the report by Honduras, the CERD
Committee recommended that the domestic Criminal Code be amended to bring it
in line with Article 4 of the Convention. Commenting on Estonia's report, the CERD
Committee noted the delegation's statements with regard to a new draft law on the
criminalization of hate crimes but was concerned at the absence of amendments to
the Penal Code prohibiting racist organizations and the dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority.85 Responding to Iraq's report, the CERD Committee rec-
ommend that Iraq's Criminal Code be amended to include an explicit provision on
the prohibition of racial discrimination in line with Article 1, paragraph 1 of the
Convention and that its draft Anti-Discrimination law complied fully with Article
4.6 In response to Poland's report the Committee recommended that "the State
party amend its criminal code, specifically making racial motivation of a crime an
aggravating circumstance and allowing for enhanced punishment to combat the
occurrence of such acts."87 Commenting on Uzbekistan's report, the CERD
Committee highlighted its concern that domestic laws did not fully meet the re-
quirements of Article 4 of the Convention and recommend that this be addressed. 81
In a similar vein, the CERD Committee noted with concern that Kazakhstan's
Criminal Code may not be fully in line with Article 4 requirements and recom-
mended that the government review its legislation."8 Responding to Montenegro's
report, the CERD Committee recommended that the government "amend the
Criminal Code to include racial, national, ethnic or ethno-religious motivation as
an aggravating circumstance when determining the punishment of crimes."9
Similarly, the Committee recommended to Luxembourg that the government "in-
84 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixteenth and Seventeenth Periodic
Reports of El Salvador, 25 September 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SLV/CO/16-17 (2014), para.
12.
85 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Tenth and Eleventh Periodic Reports of
Estonia, 22 September 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/EST/CO/10-11 (2014), para. 7.
CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fifteenth to Twenty-First Periodic
Reports ofIraq, 22 September 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/IRQ/CO/15-21 (2014), para. 12.
87 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Twentieth and Twenty-First Periodic
Reports of Poland, 19 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/POL/CO/20-21 (2014), para. 8.
CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of
Uzbekistan, 14 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/UZB/CO/8-9 (2014), para. 6.
19 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of
Kazakhstan, 14 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/KAZ/CO/6-7 (2014), para. 12.
90 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of
Montenegro, 13 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/MNE/CO/2-3 (2014), para. 8.
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troduce into its criminal legislation an aggravating circumstance for racially moti-
vated crimes"91 and to Switzerland that the government should "[i]ncorporate a
provision in the Criminal Code to the effect that committing an offence with racist
motivation or aim constitutes an aggravating circumstance allowing for more
severe punishment."92
III. The European Convention of Human Rights
The ECHR was originally drafted with the aim of preventing negative inter-
ferences with persons by State authorities.9 This is clear from, for example,
Article 8 of the Convention. Article 8(1) protects the right to respect for private
life and Article 8(2) provides that there shall be no interference with this right
except insofar as that interference is necessary in a democratic society for one of
a variety of reasons. Furthermore, Article 1 of the ECHR provides that States have
an obligation to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this European Convention," therefore placing a
general obligation on States to act to protect the rights set out in the ECHR.14
While the Convention is silent as to whether its provisions impose positive obli-
gations on States, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted
the treaty" as imposing inherent positive obligations on States to secure the
rights which it contains. 6 The Court has stated that:9
91 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic
Reports of Luxembourg, 13 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/LUX/CO/14-17 (2014), para. 11.
92 CERD, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reports of
Switzerland, 13 March 2014, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CHE/CO/7-9 (2014), para. 6.
91 See Pieter van Dijk, "'Positive Obligations' Implied in the European Convention on
Human Rights: Are the States still the 'Masters' of the Convention?," in Monique Castermans-
Holleman et al. eds., The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century. Human Rights,
International Organisations and Foreign Policy - Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr(1998),
pp. 17-18.
91 See Andrew Ashworth, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (2013), p. 198.
See Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, Judgment, Series A, No. 32, 9 October
1979 and McCann v. United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91, Judgment, Series A, No.
324, 27 September 1995.
96 See Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004); Clare Ovey
and Robin White, Jacobs and White: The European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed.,
2006), p. 51 and Ashworth, supra note 94.
91 Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, Application No. 48553/99, Judgment, 25 July 2002,
para. 96.
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The obligation to secure the effective exercise of the rights defined in that
instrument may result in positive obligations for the State [...] In such cir-
cumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive and there is [...] no
room to distinguish between acts and omissions.
The ECtHR has found that numerous provisions of the ECHR imply an obli-
gation to criminalize behavior. In this regard its practice is considerably more ex-
pansive than that of the UN HRC. 98
Despite the fact that Article 8 is a derogable right which can be interfered with
if "necessary in a democratic society," it was one of the first articles discussed by
the ECtHR in terms of positive obligations. In the case of X and Y v. Netherlands a
16 year old handicapped woman who was living in a residential home was raped
by a man living nearby. Dutch law required that a formal complaint be submitted
before a sex crime could be investigated. Parents could make a complaint on
behalf of children under the age of 16 but people over the age of 16 were required
to make the complaint themselves. The law made no provision for those who
were unable to make a complaint on their own behaves. The victim's father was of
the view that his daughter was too disturbed to make the complaint herself. The
victim and her father alleged that the Dutch law therefore breached her Article 8
rights. The Court stated that 99
[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the indi-
vidual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not
merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to
this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations in-
herent in an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations
may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for
private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves.
While the Court did not cite Article 1 or any other authority when concluding
that there were positive obligations on the State, this case sets the scene for the
discovery of various types of positive obligations on States to ensure the enjoyment
of ECHR rights."° However, does the mere existence of a positive obligation create
98 van Kempen, supra note 25, p. 17.
99 Xand Yv. Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80, Judgment, 26 March 1985, para. 23. See
also Osman v. United Kingdom, Application No. 23452/94, Judgment, 28 October 1998,
para. 115, regarding Article 2 ECHR and Siliadin v. France, Application No. 73316/01,
Judgment, 26 July 2005, para. 89, regarding Article 4.
100 Ashworth, supra note 94, p. 199.
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a requirement that States criminalize certain offences? '01 In the case of X and Y, the
ECtHR assessed a number of options of State action which would have allowed for
the respect of the victim's rights, including the option of applying for an injunction
to prevent future violations and an action for damages with regard to violations
which had already occurred. The Court, however, decided that only a criminal
sanction would be an adequate response to the violation in the particular circum-
stances of the case, stating 12
[Tlhis is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private
life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can
be achieved only by criminal-law provisions; indeed it is by such provi-
sions that the matter is normally regulated.
In a similar vein, in M.C. v. Bulgaria,03 the ECtHR stated °4
While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the
sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the
State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such
as rape, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are
at stake, requires efficient criminal-law provisions. Children and other vul-
nerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection.
Ashworth thus concludes that the "nature of the positive obligation is that all
states should have in place criminal laws that protect individuals against sexual vi-
olation by other individuals. It is not that the state is in any way responsible for the
acts of those who violate the rights of others, but that the state is responsible for
putting in place criminal laws that ensure appropriate protection for those rights."0 5
He considers that the ECtHR jurisprudence supports three forms of positive obli-
gation incumbent on the State in order to ensure the enjoyment of ECHR rights,
one of which is implementation of effective criminal law provisions and machinery
to deal with breaches of these provisions. °  This approach is evident in the case of
101 Ibid.
102 X and Y v. Netherlands, supra note 99, para. 27.
103 MC. v. Bulgaria, Application No. 39272/98, Judgment, 4 December 2003.
"I4 Ibid., para. 150.
105 Ashworth, supra note 94, p. 200.
106 The other two positive obligations are: "(i)The duty, in certain well-defined circumstances,
to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose right is at risk from
the criminal acts of another individual" and "The duty to have in place effective machinery
for investigating complaints of violations of Convention rights, combined with the duty to
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Osman v. United Kingdom °7 relating to the right to life, 108 where the ECtHR stated:' °9
It is common ground that the State's obligation [...] extends beyond its
primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective crim-
inal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person
backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression
and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions.
In addition to Article 2 and Article 8 cases, the ECtHR has found that positive
criminalization obligations arise in respect of other articles of the ECHR. Article 3
of the ECHR provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment of punishment." In the case of A v. United Kingdom, a case
concerning corporal punishment of a child, the ECtHR stated that110 it
considers that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article
1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article
3, requires States to make measures designed to ensure that individuals
within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered
by private individuals. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in par-
ticular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence,
against such serious breaches of personal integrity.
The ECtHR has placed special emphasis on the importance of the implemen-
tation of criminal law in situations of sexual crimes. In MC. v. Bulgaria, concerning
the rape of a 14 year old girl, the ECtHR held that"'
ensure that there is a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible." Ashworth, supra note 94, p. 198.
107 Osman v. United Kingdom, supra note 99.
108 See also the case of Van Colle v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7678/09, Judgment,
13 November 2012, concerning the right to life.
109 Osman v. United Kingdom, supra note 99, para. 115,
1,o A v. United Kingdom, Application No. 25599/94, Judgment, 23 September 1998, para. 22.
", M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 103, para. 166. See also Patricia Londono, "Positive
Obligations, Criminal Procedure and Rape Cases," European Human Rights Law Review,
Vol. 2 (2007), pp. 158-171 and Clare McGlynn, "Rape, Torture and the European Convention
on Human Rights," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2009),
pp. 565-595.
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Any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such as requiring
proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving certain types
of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection of the
individual's sexual autonomy. In accordance with contemporary standards
and trends in that area, the Member States' positive obligations under
Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be seen as requiring the penali-
sation and effective prosecution of any non-consensual act, including in
the absence of physical resistance by the victim.
Positive obligations and a corollary obligation to criminalize have also been
deemed to arise under Article 4 of the ECHR. Article 4 states that "no one shall be
held in slavery or servitude" and "no one shall be required to perform forced or
compulsory labour". In the case of Siliadin v. France, the ECtHR recognised a
positive obligation under Article 4 of the Convention."2 In this case, French law
was found to be flawed as it provided only civil compensation as a remedy for a
breach of Article 4 of the Convention. The case concerned a girl who was brought
from Togo to France on a tourist visa. The woman who brought her to France
promised that her immigration status would be regularized, that she could get an
education in France and that she could earn her fare for a return journey. However,
the woman kept her passport and lent her to another family, where she had to
work for 15 hours a day with no payment and no education. Her "employers"
were prosecuted but convictions for keeping the girl in conditions which affected
her human dignity were quashed and the employers were only required to face a
technical employment offence and a civil judgment for damages. She, therefore,
claimed that her Article 4 rights were violated. The ECtHR stated that a number of
international instruments placed positive obligations on States, in particular in re-
lation to children and other vulnerable groups. Therefore, the ECtHR concluded
that "governments have positive obligations [...] to adopt criminal law provisions
which penalise the practices referred to in Article 4 and to apply them in practice."''
In the quite similar case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the ECtHR said
that"4 it
112 Siliadin v. France, supra note 99. In relation to the Siliadin case, see Holly Cullen,
"Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention on
Human Rights," Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2006), pp. 585-592.
1 Siliadin v. France, supra note 99, para. 89.
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Application No. 25965/04, Judgment, 7 January 2010, para.
284. In relation to the positive obligations doctrine trafficking see, Ryszard Piorowicz,
"States' Obligations under Human Rights Law towards Victims of Trafficking in Human
Beings: Positive Developments in Positive Obligations," International Journal of Refugee
Law, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2012), pp. 181-201 and Vladislava Stoyanova, "Article 4 of the ECHR
and the Obligation of Criminalising Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Human
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considers that the spectrum of safeguards set out in national legislation
must be adequate to ensure practical and effective protection of the rights
of victims or potential victims of trafficking. Accordingly, in addition to
criminal law measures to punish traffickers, Article 4 requires Member
States to put in place adequate measures regulating businesses often used
as a cover for human trafficking. Furthermore, a state's immigration rules
must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or
tolerance of trafficking.
While States may be obliged to criminalize certain types of behaviour in order
prevent the violation of human rights of non-State actors even in the absence of an
obligation to criminalize, the ECtHR has also, at times, considered whether non-
criminal remedies would be sufficient to ensure the enjoyment of ECHR rights, in-
cluding free legal assistance. '15
In recent cases such as Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, '6 Seji6 v. Croatia'7
and Abdu v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR has emphasized the importance of a criminal
justice response to hate crimes.1 8 In Abdu, the applicant was a Sudanese national
living in Bulgaria. He and his friend were attacked by two Bulgarian skinheads,
and he suffered a number of injuries. The victim alleged to police that, while he
was being attacked, his attackers uttered a number of racial insults. Despite this,
Bulgarian police did not question witnesses about the alleged remarks, nor did
they investigate the possibility that the attack was racially motivated (which would
have rendered it punishable by imprisonment). Though an investigation was
launched, the prosecutor dismissed the case and a subsequent appeal was dis-
missed. The ECtHR noted that despite the increase in racially motivated acts in
Bulgaria and despite having plausible evidence pointing to a possible racist motive
on the part of Mr. Abdu's attackers, the authorities had failed in their duty to take
all reasonable steps to establish the accuracy of that evidence by failing to question
witnesses in relation to the allegations of racism. The Court found a violation of
the procedural aspect of Article 3, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.
The ECtHR has held that the State has a duty to adopt criminal law provisions
trafficking," Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 2
(2014), pp. 407-443.
115 However, the ECtHR has, at times, considered whether non-criminal remedies would be
sufficient to ensure the enjoyment of ECHR rights. See Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, supra
note 114.
n6 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, Judgment by
the Grand Chamber, 6 July 2005.
117 ei6 v. Croatia, Application No. 40116/2002, Judgment, 31 May 2007.
118 Abdu v. Bulgaria, Application No. 26827/08, Judgment, 11 March 2014.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND "CRIMINALIZATION" 67
to deter the commission of offences against the person. In addition, the State must
investigate alleged breaches of rights and prosecute and punish those guilty of
breaching such rights.119 The ECtHR has also held that States are under a positive
obligation to criminalize certain activities in order to ensure compliance with the
Article 3 prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment, which covers rape and domestic violence. 120
It is clear that the trend established by the ECtHR of implying a criminalization
obligation into the provisions of the ECHR has placed additional obligations on
States to reassess their domestic criminal law and indeed, as Ashworth states, the
development of the positive obligations doctrine by the ECtHR "has brought some
welcome minimum standards for the criminal law of Member States [of the Council
of Europe].' '2
Conclusion
In recent years, public international law has increasingly focused on victims'22
and numerous attempts have been made to address the previously pervasive
culture of impunity whereby there was a lack of accountability for violations of
international law.2' As Huneeus states "[t]he emphasis has [...] shifted away from a
state's general duty to guarantee rights and toward the victim's individual right to
have the government investigate and punish.""'' The establishment of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals in the 1990s and the creation of the ICC have engendered the
development of criminal law principles to address serious violations of interna-
tional law. This emphasis on criminal law has now, as this article has illustrated,
been furthered by human rights monitoring bodies and courts. While not estab-
lished for the purpose of implementing criminal law, these bodies and courts, es-
119 Osman v. United Kingdom, supra note 99, paras. 115-116.
120 See M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 103, paras. 148-153, 185-186 with regard to rape and
Opuz v. Turkey, Application No. 33401/02, Judgment, 9 June 2009, paras. 128-130 and 159
with regard to domestic violence.
121 Ashworth, supra note 94, p. 209.
12 The focus on the interests of victims can be attributed to the influence of human rights
law, but also to the development of other disciplines, such as transitional justice and
victimology. See Christine Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims
of Armed Conflict (2012), pp. 117-122.
123 Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent eds., From Sovereign Impunity to International
Accountability. The Search for Justice in a World of States (2004).
124 Alexandra Huneeus, "International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal
Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107,
No. 1 (2013), p. 8.
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pecially the ECtHR, have carved out a significant criminal law mandate.'25 The
European trend is also observable in other human rights regional systems. In the
Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in Veldsquez Rodriguez
v. Honduras'26 that the obligations on States Parties under Article 1 of the Inter-
American Convention to respect and ensure the rights enshrined therein "implies
the duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general,
all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are ca-
pable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."'27 The
Court also observed that the duty to prevent human rights violations includes "all
those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote
the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and
treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those respon-
sible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for damages. '"' 2 The African
Commission on Human Rights has also made a number of recommendations with
regard to the criminalization of certain acts in order to ensure the protection of
economic, social and cultural rights. 129 In respect of Article 4 of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights (the right to life), 130 it has been found that States
had a number of obligations to ensure its implementation, including "the necessity
to conduct effective official investigations when individuals have been killed as a
result of the use of force by agents of the State, to secure the right to life by
making effective provisions in criminal law to deter the commission of offences
against the person, to establish law-enforcement machinery for the prevention,
suppression, investigation and penalisation of breaches of criminal law."'' The
African Union has also announced that it is considering adding criminal jurisdiction
to the proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
3 2
125 Ibid., pp. 1-44.
126 Velsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No.
4 (1988).
127 Ibid., para. 166.
'- Ibid., para. 175.
129 African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples'Rights, available at <http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-
cultural/achpr-instr-guide-draft escrights-eng.pdf>.
130 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
,3, Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)
v. Sudan, 279/03-296/05 (2009), para. 147.
13 See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
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These developments in the regional human rights systems are a reflection of
the growing emphasis on positive obligations in respect of human rights instru-
ments. In this vein, Chirwa comments: "[tihe shift from a minimalist conception of
human rights duties as negative edicts to an acceptance of positive obligations,
especially the duty to protect, signifies the realization that state inaction or non-in-
terference, far from being the guarantor of freedom, can leave individuals prone to
human rights violations and, consequently, form a potential basis for state respon-
sibility where the violations were preventable and 'redressible."'' ' 3 As this article
has highlighted, one of the more important elements of the positive obligations
doctrine is the duty to criminalize certain acts which constitute human rights viola-
tions. Albeit it is the ECtHR that has been in the vanguard, with other regions, and
indeed the UN, slower to embrace a criminalization approach, we can observe a
developing trend internationally that will serve to both strengthen domestic
criminal law and improve human rights protection.
However, this development is not unproblematic in as much as it is propelling
a movement from "human rights by persuasion" to "human rights by coercion. '",
The traditional approach taken in human rights treaties and by their monitoring
bodies was to encourage States to build a framework which would protect human
rights domestically. The criminalization approach demands that States change or
adopt their domestic criminal law to standards set by the human rights monitoring
bodies. Huneeus states that "[i]n pushing for accountability, the human rights
bodies exert a jurisdiction quite different from that traditionally exercised by the
international and hybrid criminal courts. Whereas those courts directly conduct the
prosecutorial work, the rights bodies entrust local justice systems with the cor-
rective actions, monitoring their work from afar but at times in detail, and exerting
pressure by publishing compliance reports and holding hearings." She continues
that "[the rights bodies' methods are thus more deferential to states and, inevi-
tably, slower to reach prosecutorial outcomes." She does, however, identify merits,
stating: "[blut they have important virtues. They foster local processes of justice,
memory, and judicial reform. They are able to pair restorative justice and victim-
centered remedies with retributive justice. And significantly, it is the state rather
than the international community that shoulders the cost of prosecution."13'
States and scholars have questioned the legitimacy of such self-extension of
court's powers, particularly in the case of the Inter-American Court of Human
May 2014, O.A.U. Doc. STC/Legal/Min/7(t) Rev. 1 (2014).
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135 Huneeus, supra note 124, p. 2.
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Rights.136 Indeed, Venezuela opted to remove itself from the Court's jurisdiction in
2012 when it denounced the American Convention on Human Rights. 37 The ex-
tension of human rights bodies' role in the sphere of criminal law may, therefore,
be detrimental to the overall stability of the international human rights law regime
inasmuch as States may be more reluctant to ratify human rights treaties if they
fear that this will leave them open to burdensome criminal law obligations. Indeed,
the extensive interpretation of human rights treaties by human rights bodies also
calls the principle of legality into question. 1m
While the extension of the positive obligations doctrine has been observed
clearly in some regional systems, 13 9 it has yet to be seriously tested at the UN level
and its potential benefits and problems are yet to manifest themselves. We may
thus conclude that the question of whether the criminalization approach is a suc-
cessful development in the field of human rights is an open one.
136 See Ezequiel Malarino, "Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal
and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights," International
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at <http://www.oas.org/en/media-center/press-release.asp?sCodigo=E-307/12>.
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